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Robert John
University ofKansas
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Over the last thirty years a number of sociologists have
addressed the prospects of transforming sociology into a truly
scientific discipline. This project has been translated into an
ongoing debate between various proponents of opposing view-
points in the literature on construction. In this paper I propose to
analyze and compare the three major approaches toward theory
construction, and the methods to which they adhere. In acco~p­
lishing this task I will concentrate on three main exemplars of
these competing approaches: "grounded" theory advanced by
Barney G. Glaser and Anselm L. Strauss; "propositional" theory
by Hubert M. Blalock; and "exact" theory by David Willer.
BACKGROUND
Recoiling from the sterile formalism of Talcott Parsons,
Robert Merton (1949) made the call for "middle-range" theories,
and those engaged in empirical endeavors proceeded to carry this
iJljunctio.nforward;, This shift toward "middle-range"· theories
sought to avoid theq.ual pitfalls of speculation and the rnere
collection of empirical trivia. The sentiment that sociology would
progress toward maturity as a science through modest short-range
theoretical goals served to focus effort on the substantive areas
of sociology. Merton believed that once solid theories had been
developed for a number of the substantive areas they could then
be unified into more comprehensive theoretical systems until the
ultimate goal of grand theory was achieved.
The following decade represents the ascendence of quantita-
tive methods and. a corresponding decline of the qualitative met-
hods that were common prior to 1940. In 1954 the first edition
of Hans Zetterberg's· On Theory and Verification in Sociology
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gave systematic expression to the "propositional"! approach in
the construction of sociological theory. This conception has since
built the most substantial following in sociology, and the version
developed by Hubert Blalock is representative of the propositional
approach to theory as it is currently practiced.
A wave of reaction against propositional theory began in
the mid-1960s with the revival of an approach to theory construc-
tion that was compatible with previously developed qualitative
methods. Glaser and Strauss (1967:viii), dissatisfied with the
relative stagnation of theory, identified the problem as an "undue
emphasis on verification." Their goal was the generation of theory
from data, hence theory was to be generated by and grounded in
empirical reality. S.T. Bruyn (1967) supplemented the underpin-
ning of a grounded theory by placing emphasis on the essentially
phenomenological basis of the qualitative approach, and the con-
comitant importance of the operation of mind and the creation
of meaning, topics that Glaser and Strauss failed to develop.
The final approach to theory is that developed by David
Willer. The emergence of "exact" theory is best explained through
an abbreviated intellectual biography of Willer. In 1967 he pub-
lished Scientific Sociology: Theory and Method which was an
attempt to translate the ideas of logical-positivism into sociolo-
gical practice. This book subscribed to the tenets of propositional
theory and placed him within the mainstream of this approach.
The next work .(1973), co-authored with Judith Willer, was
a critiqu~Qf the position advanced in Scientijic Sociology,.. Here
the attempt to emulate logical-positivism was abandoned in a
scathing critique of empiricism, but little was systematically
presented that could take its place. The positive contribution
toward a method for advancing theory was formulated in the
paper "What is Exact Theory?" (Willer, 1978). Building on the'
perceived shortcomings of the propositional tradition Willer
presented a method that laid claim to the scientific tradition
of Galileo, Newton, and Einstein. In contrast to the proposi-
tional approach, the method advocated by Willer is significant
in that the works of the classical tradition of sociology, par-
ticularly Marx and Weber, were once again considered important.
In short, the classics were not simply interesting literature but of
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theoretical significance. This preliminary sketch of the' develop-
ment of theory construction is intended to provide a sufficient
contextual awareness for a detailed examination of the major
components of each of these views.
PROPOSITIONAL THEORY
Those authors whom I subsume under the label of proposi-
tional theorists all share one determinant characteristic. Each,
whether attempting to assert causality or follow the strictures
of logical-positivism, equates theories with empirical generaliza-
tions. Thus, whether the authors admit this assumption or deli-
berately- ignore it, their entire enterprise subsists on a particular
view of the nature of reality, which means their enterprise is
valid only to the extent that this view is accurate. Some of the
proponents of this school are bolder than others in their advocacy
of this world-view. Janet Saltzman Chafetz (1978:35) equates
this world-view with science:
The scientific process requires the ... assumption that there is
order in the universe and that this order is also comprehensible by
human beings. If each event, process, and phenomenon were
absolutely unique and/or occurred randomly .. _, there could be
no generalization. Without generalization there is no science.
In other words, all sciences attempt to generalize about recurrent
phenomena. _'" '.,. ~,
The essence of this conception of the creation of" meaning ill
science is that theories are human verbalizations that merely
express relationships existing in the world. Theory then becomes
nothing more than systematic summary statements of empirical
regularities that represent processes and events that occur in
reality. The goal of theory from this perspective is to link these
empirical generalizations into a comprehensive explanation of the
world. Each of the proponents of propositional theory shares this
world-view, conceives of grand theory as the long-term goal of the
sociological project, and holds as a general orientation that the
17
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proper means to advance theory construction is through the for-
mulation and testing of formal statements.
A number of semantic distinctions give the appearance that
the differences among these propositional proponents is greater
than actually exists. I intend to ignore these subtle distinctions,
since they are more contrived than substantial and would only
shift the focus from the essential agreement that characterizes
this school. Let it suffice to say that the differences among these
proponents center on when to call a proposition an axiom,
theorem, hypothesis or postulate, and other such weighty matters.
For the sake of simplicity I will adopt the usage of Hubert Blalock
and Nan Lin, and outline the general procedures that produce a
testable hypothesis.
According to Blalock (1969:2) theories "must contain law-
like propositions that interrelate the concepts or variables two or
more at a time." A similar conception is offered by Lin (1976:18),
although he emphasizes the relationship between concepts rather
than the nomological properties of the propositions themselves.
For Blalock, propositions can be divided into two sub-categories:
axioms and theorems. Axioms are "untested (or untestable)
assumptions" (1969:11), and "imply direct causal links among
variables" (1969:18). They provide the basis from which
theorems are deduced in accordance with the rules of logic. In
comparison with axioms, theorems are state "in terms of co-
variations and temporal sequences, thereby making them test-
able" (Blalock, 1969.:18). A quote bvPaul Davidson Reynolds
(1971 :69) places this notion in the context of the scientific
enterpriseas conceivedby propositional theorists.
The heart of scientific knowledge is expressed in relational
statements.... Relational statements can be classified into two
broad groups, those that describe an association between two
concepts and those that describe a causal relation between two
concepts.
The emphasis on causality is a primary attribute of this
school. Blalock, Chafetz, Stinchcornbe (1968), and Wallace (1971)
18
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all consider the discovery of causal links an integral objective of
science. Although Blalock (1961:6) admits that "causal thinking
belongs completely on the theoretical level and ... causal laws
can never be demonstrated empirically" he nevertheless proceeds
to test hypotheses in hopes of making causal inferences. Chafetz ,
(1978 :35) likewise views causality as a felicitous assumption
compatible with her prior assumption of an ordered universe:
The assumption of an orderly universe is closely connected to
another important assumption made by all sciences.... [S] cien-
tists must assume causality, or the logical connection between
perceiveable events, processes, and other phenomena.
The necessity of imputing causality is attributed to the practical
need for a foundation of knowledge not based on "pure faith"
(1978:36).2
Constructing hypotheses through the axiom-logical deduction-
theorem sequence occurs on the theoretical level. The product of
this process is an hypothesis stated in the form of a relationship
between two or more concepts. In order to test this hypothesis,
which constitutes a theory for Blalock, the concepts are linked
into a causal model detailing the relationships among the various
concepts. This model is then used to help construct regression
equations appropriate for the particular causal model.
Before the hypothesis can be tested, each concept must be
operationalized, Blalock .(19~9: 153) differentiates the conceptual
level from the operational level by the use of labels. He terms 'the
conceptual level of theory the "main theory" and the operational
level the "auxiliary theory." Blalock has done nothing unique here
and those familiar with empirical methods will recognize an
"auxiliary theory" as the product of the assignment of measurable
empirical indicators or proxies for the concepts of the theory.
Unlike the strict operationalist approach in which "the con-
cept is defmed to be that which is measured" (Bailey, 1978 :48),
Blalock does not believe that anyone, or even a number, of
variables adequately capture the essence of a concept, especially
not more abstract concepts. He considers this problem inherent
in the operationalization of abstract concepts, which makes
19
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certain simplifying assumptions necessary. Blalock (1969:151)
calls this the· "measurement problem" and notes that the "aux-
iliary theory must also contain assumptions concerning the opera-
tion of omitted variables that produce both error terms in the
equation and measurement errors in each of the variables."
The problems inherent in making these as well as other
assumptions necessitates the inclusion of error terms in the re-
gression equations and vigilance in the choice and administration
of measurement instruments. Thus, technical competence cannot
simply solve the measurement problem, which is predominantly
conceptual.
Once the theory has been fully operationalized the verifica-
tion process can begin. Blalock- (1969:11) does not believe that
theories can ever be verified "unless all possible competing alter-
natives can be rejected." Since this possibility is unlikely, (because
of measurement error and the potential influence of variables not
considered), Blalock (1969:12) concludes that "we shall be in
the unfortunate situation of having _to proceed by eliminating
inadequate theories, rather than ever really establishing any of
them." The issue of the falsifiability of hypotheses is characteristic
of this school and those who subscribe to this notion believe that
this is generally true of all science. They recognize the provisional
nature of scientific knowledge and take comfort that, since their
knowledge also is provisional, they are equally engaged in the
accumulation of scientific knowledge.
This raises _a serious problem concerning the _goal of ever _
more comprehensive theories. If the findings of this variety of
research .are open-to falsification, how then is the .ultimate goal
of grand theory to be accomplished? Zetterberg (1966:127)
answers this with the familiar empiricists' palliative: re plic ability·
The universality of a sociological proposition is an assumption
which we have to confirm by extensive replications of our
studies.... [W]e have to confirm our propositions on different
subject matters ... in different categories ... before we can
claim a hypothesis verified.
//
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Reynolds concurs in this conclusion and makes a useful
distinction between an hypothesis, an empirical generalization
and a law.
To summarize, if there is as yet no empirical evidence for or
against a statement, it is called a hypothesis; if there is moderate
support, it is called an empirical generalization; if the support
is "overwhelming," it is called a law (Reynolds, 1971:80).
Although Reynolds qualifies the last part of this statement by
noting that "overwhelming" evidence may never produce enough
consensus to consider a theoretical statement a law, Zetterberg's
conception is consistent with Reynolds' characterization of the
progression from generalization to scientific law. Zetterberg
(1966: 14) maintains that "the distinction between findings and
laws is one of degree of generality and degree of empirical sup-
port."
Blalock (1970:82-83) also embraces this distinction when he
states that "the most useful scientific laws ... are ... 'if-then'
statements," although the scientific laws of society he offers are
hardly comparable to the more familiar "laws of nature" of the
physical sciences. For Blalock (1961: 17) the laws in the social
sciences are statistical in nature, which is to say merely probabi-
listic, because they are applied "to real-world situations rather
than ideal ones. Truly universal laws, holding without exception,
can never be expected _to apply to real situations because of the
influence of disturbing factors."
GROUNDED THEORY
A second major approach to theory construction has been
offered by Glaser and Strauss (1967). They call their approach
"grounded" theory, but it could be called "emergent" theory
with as much justification. Like propositional theory, the
grounded theory technique seeks to develop generalizations from
data. Grounded theory, however, breaks with the canons of rigor
common to the propositional approach.
21
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Though Glaser and Strauss (1967:6) assert that their method
of theory construction is phenomenological, their ~l~ to a
phenomenological foundation is curious if not misinformed.
Glasser and Strauss (1967:3) do advance a position consistent
with phenomenology when they state: "of course, the researcher
does not approach reality as a tabla rasa. He must have ~ p~r~pec­
tive that will help him see relevant data and abstract significant
categories from his scrutiny of the data." They proceed to con-
tradict this point and neglect the importance of the researcher's
perspective in theory construction when they assert that "the
categories are discovered by examination of the data" (1967:3).
A more faithful interpretation of the phenomenological
approach would stress theory as a creation of human conscious-
ness since it is human beings and not data that formulate theory.
Richard J. Bernstein (1976:128-129) develops this theme at
length in The Restructuring of Social ~nd Political '0eory . For
him, the essence of a phenomenological approach IS that the
"everyday life-world is pre-scientific not only in that i~ eXiste~
prior to the development of modern science, but ~so m that. It
is presupposed in all our scientific endeavors." Taking the point
even further, a well-known phenomenologist (Kockelmans,
1978:4) argues that "theoretical activities cannot be describ~d as
a 'merely looking at t~ings' (object~vity). w~ich a~to~at1cally
emerges when one refrains from all practical (subjective) con-
cerns." Yet this is the view of theory construction that Glaser and
Strauss offer, an outlook consistent with the conc.~ptio~of theory
construction held by propositional theorists.
In their tacit ~ support of this "view of theory construction
Glaser and Strauss reduce phenomenology to the vague reminder
that the human mind is an important element in the process of
theory construction, and the equally unspecified idea that th.e
researcher is not to impose categories on the phenomena. This
oversimplification of phenomenology does violence to the in~e­
grity of the grounded theory approach, and accounts for Its
capitulation to the viewpoint of an empirical epistemology on
several crucial issues.
The first concession to the empiricism of the propositional
approach is made on the view of the world. Both grounded and
22
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propositional theory share the assumption that it is actually the
dead weight of the world as it impresses itself on the theorist
that permits the empirical regularities of the world to be dis-
cerned and formulated into theories. Both Glaser and Strauss
and the propositional theorists believe that the world has an
objective existence independent of the human mind, in contrast
to the phenomenological principle that "objectivity" is a product
of human consciousness.
The other two crucial concessions are related and can be
summarized as the nature. of science and the role of grounded
theory in the scientific enterprise. From a phenomenological
perspective, Glaser and Strauss would be seen as equating empir-
icism with science. The differences between an empirical and a
phenomenological science cannot be discussed here, but are
addressed by Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1967:488ff) in a pheno-
menological interpretation of the method of Galileo and Newton,
and in a more directly sociological context by David Dickens
(1979 :328ff). The difference between phenomenological science
and empirical science is neatly reflected in the irony of an
empirical epistemology that proclaims the empirical method as a
neutral picturing of reality, and considers the resulting knowledge
objective. The irony lies in the fact that empiricists actually
approach their research with a formal a priori conception of what
is significant. In contrast, the phenomenologist explicitly attempts
to avoid preconceptions, while at the same time realizing that pre-
conceptions are inevitable. .
The statements of Glaser and Strauss about the relationship
'-of grounded theory to the scientific e-nterprise reveal "that they
consider grounded theory as a fIrst approximation toward the
goal of science. For instance, Glaser and Strauss (1967:3) assert
that "theory should provide clear enough categories and hypoth-
eses so that crucial ones can be verified in present and future
research; they must be clear enough to be readily operational-
ized ... in quantative ways." Glaser and Strauss make many
reverential statements about the ways in which grounded theory
can serve the ends of verificational studies and thus participate
vicariously in the scientific endeavor. An excellent example is
provided by Glaser (1969:219) when he said "partial testing of
23
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the theory ... is left to more rigorous, usually quantitative,
approaches which come late in the scientific enterprise." To the
phenomenologist, such deference is misplaced, since the results ~f
phenomenological inquiries result in scientific kno~l~~ge: ~1lS
last point is forcefully made by Husserl when he said .It 15 high
time that people got over being dazzled. · · by the ideal and
regulative ideas and methods of the 'exact' sciences-as though
the in-itself of such sciences were actually an absolute norm for
objective being and for truth" (quoted in Dickens, 1979:330).
Grounded theory, as formulated by Glaser and Strauss, does
not constitute a distinct approach to theory construction simply
because it is not consistently phenomenological. If,however,
the foreign elements imported from an empirical epistemology
were purged, and a consistent phenomenological underpinning
provided, grounded theory could be a coherent ~pproac~ .to t~e
generation of theory. If we ignore the philos?p~lcal deflclen~les
and attendant mistakes, the bulk of the descriptive and practical
advice given by Glaser and Strauss is of great value.. .
Probably the most important component of their practical
advice is what they call the "constant comparative" method.
Glaser and Strauss tout the flexibility of this method and assert
that it is best conceived as a process. Rather than the mechanical
and formal procedures required of the propositional theorist,
a grounded theorist must immerse himself in a soc~al setting and,
if no preconceptions distort perception, theory will emerge as a
consequence of the experience. Insight is crucial to the success
of this venture.
',' Glaser describes .four stage-s of the constant comparative
method, three of which are relevant here. In the first stage the
researcher begins by coding each incident and event by creating
as many categories as possible. Once this process has begUh,
the researcher must compare each new incident with other in-
cidents coded in the same category. Thus, this stage entails con-
stant comparison of each incident with every other. Shortly
~fter this process has begun the
constant comparison of incidents ... starts to generate theore-
tical properties of the category. One starts thinking in terms of
24
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the full range of types or continua of the category, its dimen-
sions, the conditions under which'it is pronounced or minimized,
its major consequences, the relation of the category to other
categories, and other properties of the category (Glaser, 1969:
221).
In the next stage of the method an actual theory begins to
emerge as the relationships of categories and properties become
apparent. Glaser (1969:221-22) characterizes the comparisons
in this stage as a "change from comparison of incident with in-
cident to incident with properties of the category which resulted
from initial comparison ofincidents" during the first stage of the
process. It is in this second stage that theory begins to emerge:
Thus the 'theory develops as different categories and their
properties tend to become integrated through constant compari-
sons which force the analyst to make some related theoretical
sense of each comparison (Glaser, 1969:222).
In the third stage of the process, the theory becomes de-
limited at the theoretical and the categorical levels.
First, the theory solidifies in the sense that major modifications
become fewer and fewer as one compares the next incidents of
a category to properties of it (Glaser, 1969 :222).
Second, the categories are delimited in two respects. In one, the
,riumb'er of .categories - become' Iimited, either' through consoli-
dation or elimination of categories not theoretically relevant.
A second type of categorical definition is, even more important,
and is an indication that the usefulness of fieldwork may be
ending. Glaser terms this the theoretical "saturation" of the cate-
gories. Glaser (1969:223) explains it in this manner:
After one has coded incidents for the same category a number of
times, it becomes a quick operation to see whether or not the
next applicable incident points to a new aspect of the category.
25
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In particular, negative cases are extremely important when making
a decision about whether the theory is complete or needs work.
If negative cases can be subsumed by the theory, and if the cate-
gories have become "saturated" to the point that little advantage
will result from more study, then it is time to leave the field and
formally compose the theory.
Glaser and Strauss (1967) identify two elements of theory ,
the first of which is relevant to my purposes here. The first is the
set of conceptual categories and their conceptual properties.
Following Blumer (1964), Glaser and Strauss state that concepts
should have two "essential features." Concepts should be analytic,
that is to say indicative of characteristics of concrete entities, and
sensitizing, which is to say they should provide a meaningful
frame of reference for those engaged in the social setting.
Since grounded theory prescribes a method in which the
generation of theory is the goal,. a number of ~su.e~ that are
important to propositional theorists also have slgmficance for
those constructing grounded theories. In contrast to the em-
phasis propositional theorists place on the falsifiabil~tyof the~ries,
Glaser and Strauss (1967:232) realize that theories are neither
true nor false: "It is not correct to say that because a theory 'does
not fit' a structure, then it is invalid." The reason for this was
given in an earlier passage: "[E] vidence and testing never destroy
a theory (of any generality), they only modify it. A theory's
only replacement is a ·better theory" (Glaser and Strauss, 1967:
28).. . .. .
Neither is the. kind. of evidence or the number of cases cru-
cial for generating theory. Glaser (1969:218-19) responds to the
issue of the replicability of the results, although indirectly, when
he admits that "the constant comparative method is not de-
signed ... to guarantee that two analysts working independently
with the same data will achieve the same results." The reason for
this is that theory is a process and hence historical and develop-
mental. For the grounded theorist the goal of a frozen universal
empirical generalization (a "law of society") is impossible. Propo-
sitional theorists lament that not much progress has been made
toward their goal and that their immature science calls for m?re
disciplined and rigorous methods. For the grounded theonsts
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the entire project of theory construction promoted by proposi-
tional theorists is wrong because history and change are not
considered integral to social phenomena.
As a final point of comparison with propositional theory,
Glaser does not consider the constant comparative method ap-
propriate for testing hypotheses. Since the goal is to generate
theory that is unique and a product of the research process "the
approach presented here cannot be used for provisional testing
as well as discovering theory" (Glaser, 1969:219).
EXACT THEORY
The starting point of exact theory is a critique of the empiri-
cal world-view that has dominated the social sciences for the last
three decades. Exact theory is not based on empirical generaliza-
tions nor any assumption 'about the regularity of the universe.
In contrast to propositional theorists who believe that "generaliza-
tions are ordered by phenomena . . . [e] xact theory orders pheno-
mena" (Willer, 1978:3). This means that theories are not summary
statements about the regularities that exist in the world but are
products of rationality. Willer claims that this is consistent with
the way in which theories are used in the natural sciences.
Stephen Toulmin (1953 :43) provides support for this view
when he observes that
discoveries in the physical sciences consist in the introduction of
fresh ways of look~g at phenomena and in the application of
new modes of representation, rather than in "the discovery 'of "new
generalizations.
In other words, it is not the regularities of the world that deter-
mine the terms of a theory. Instead, theory orders phenomena by
providing a new. interpretation of the phenomena. It is theory
that determines which empirical phenomena will be considered
and which will be disregarded. Willer (1978: 12) clarifies this
further when he states that "once a theory is formed, it serves as
a guide to observation. It tells us what to observe and what to
ignore. "
27
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Unlike the method of theory construction proffered by
propositional proponents, but consistent with what is known
about some of the most revolutionary innovations in scientific
theory, exact theory reserves a central place for the role of in-
sight or a purely rational component in theory constructio~.3
It is within this context that Einstein's assertion that theories
"are free inventions of the human intellect" (quoted in Willer
and Willer, 1973:11) can be understood. .
With these considerations in mind, Willer consciously seeks
to cast exact theory in the mold of the theoretical enterprise
of the physical sciences. To accomplish this he returns to the
writings of the early creators of the natural sciences and con-
cluds that three features are essential to the construction of
theories. He identifies a modeling procedure, theoretic principles,
and a theoretic calculus as the fundamental components of exact
theory, each of which is unique to this method of theory con-
struction.
Consciously emulating the procedures used by Galileo,
Willer recommends devising a model as the first step in the
attempt to create an exact theory for a phenomenon. For Willer,
a model has a decisive purpose:
[M] odels generated from the theories are structured representa-
tions of the relationships dictated by the theories. Conversely,
the creation of a useful theory requires the abstraction of a
_pure structural model from the diverse .material of observation
(Willer and Willer, 1973: 24).
In short the model is the crucial link between empirical phenom-
ena and theory, and represents both. The model accomplishes this
task through a geometrical representation of both the theoretical
and empirical levels, and contains only what is theoretically
relevant while simultaneously charting the relations of the real
world in abstract form. According to Willer, the modeling pro-
cedure provides exact theory with the ability to extend a.theory's
application beyond the limitation common to empirical general-
izations. In contrast to theory based on empirical generalizations,
in which the theory can be extended only to empirical phenomena
28
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that are similar to one another, exact theories can be applied to a
broad range of p~enomena at an abstract level. The range of
phenomena to which the theory can be applied constitutes the
"scope" of the theory.
The second element of exact theory is the set of theoret.
. . I f ICprlnclp es, none 0 which are empirical generalizations. Th _
retic principles are not expression of regularities of the world,
These principles are specifications of crucial idealizations of the
p~en?mena to be theorized about. Interpreted literally, these
principles wo~ld e!ther be. wr:ong or make no sense. An example
?ffered by ~iller IS the principle from theoretical optics specify-
mg . that "light travels in straight lines." Anyone with even a
rudunentary knowledge of optics can think of a number of in-
stances. w~ere .th~s is simply not true. Therefore, as an empirical
~enerahzatl~n :: IS. w0:thless, but as a simplifying assumption it
IS valuable in estunatmg the proper scope of application of the
theoretic system" (Willer, 1978:8).
The third element of exact theory, the theoretic calculus,
expre~ses the terms and relations of the theory. As conceived
by Willer (1978:10), the "calculus of any exact theory consists
of a set of formal statements, normally presented in mathematical
form." Unlike ~he use ?f mathematics in the propositional ap-
proach, theoretic calcuh do not contain probabilities but are
st~te~ in terms of equivalence. This is possible because ''the
principles and calculus of the theory are not applied directly to
data but to the rnode] itself'.' .(Willer, 1978:8). The obvious ad-
vantage of th~s is. that an exact theoretic calculus will permit an
exact ca.lc~latlOn and the~efore an exact prediction of possible
re.sults. ThIS e~~ct calculatIon enables a comparison of the model
WIth the empirical phenomena in question in order to assess the
explanatory power of the model. Once the model has been com-
pared with the empirical phenomena a determination can be
made about th~ "scope': and "isomorphism" of the theory. Both
th~ ~cope and isomorphism are important criteria and govern the
valIdIty. of. the theory in each of its applications. Willer explains
these criteria:
29
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To the extent that the theory ... successfully orders the data
of the empirical instance in question, that theory is said to be
isomorphic. The extent of isomorphism in any given applica-
tion is the measure of the precision of the theory. The range of
instances to which the theory can be precisely applied is the
measure of the scope of the theory. The evaluation of any exact
theory is based jointly upon its precision and its scope (Willer,
1978:5).
It is important to note that theories of limited scope and
isomorphism are in no way falsified. Since exact theories are
not empirical generalizations they cannot be refuted by empiri-
cal events. There is essential agreement with Glaser and Strauss
on this point. The issue is not one of truth or falsity but of appli-
cability. Does the theory adequately explain and predict the
empirical phenomena? If so then there is no need to repeat the
study since replicability, the piling on of confirming instances,
is pointless unless one suspects a significant change in conditions.
An exact theorist would have no interest in repeating the test of
the theory under the same circumstances because the importance
of an exact theory is determined by the range (scope) of phenom-
ena it can explain and predict. An exact theorist is always looking
for new tests to perform.
A second area of divergence with propositional theory is
over the issue 0 f causality. According to Willer and Willer (1973:
20££), the discovery. of causal connections is 110t the goal of
science. Analysis of laws from the natural sciences reveals that
~cientific laws are" determinative, not" 'causal. t"fhis, viewpoint is
also held by Toulmin, and he called attention to the relative
absence of the concept of causality in scientific writing as evi-
dence. Toulmin (1953: 120) affirmed that the interest in causality
was an essentially pragmatic one that reflected an interest "in
producing, preventing or counteracting.... Correspondingly, to
discover the cause ... is to find out what it is that needs to be
altered, if we are to produce, prevent or counteract."
A corollary issue that serves to distinguish propositional
and exact theories is the issue of probability. The name of exact
theory is derived from this important distinction. Willer (1978:11)
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emphasized this point: "No theoretic calculi contain probabilities."
~~is means t~at the sophisticated statistical tests used by propo-
sitional theonsts to compare the results with the likelihood that
the outcome is attributable to chance are inappropriate. To an
exact theorist, comparing everything with the likelihood that it
is merely accidental exhibits the poverty of the propositional
appr?a~h. Because exact theory is not based on probability,
predictions can. b.e made ~or. individual cases. This is generally
untrue of statistical predictiona, which refer to hypothetical
or actual populations. The best statisticians can do is estimate
the likelihood of an occurrence. This, however, does not ade-
quately map a real world in which things do not "probably"
happen. Events either occur or they do not.
. As I have attempted to show, exact theory and proposi-
tional theory are diametrically opposed. The only common
feature they share is the goal of all science, prediction and ex-
planation, but this is not enough to reconcile the differences
between them. However, this discordance need not characterize
relations between grounded theory and exact theory, since they
share some fundamental elements.
. Although Willer does not develop this aspect of exact theory,
hIS method shares some features with the phenomenological
approac~ to the world. For Willer, theory is created through an
abstractive process that bridges the empirical and rational. Al-
though he emphasized the construction of theory as a "free
invention" of the human mind, this is a purposeful overstatement
des~ned to ref~te th: technical approach that currently dominates
SOCiology., It 15 obVIOUS that Willer does not contend that no
knowledge of the world is necessary to produce theories. Thus
with the qualification that each of us shares a pre-scientific view
of the world as conscious human beings, the position of exact
theory. is similar to the constructivist emphasis of the phenorn-
enological approach, and the role of intuition is provided a phil-
osophical grounding.
Consider~~ion o~ human motivation, or the "actor's pre-
ference states as Willer (1978:31£f) terms them, is a second
element of ~xact theory resonant with a phenomenological ap-
proach. Unlike the behaviorist position in social science, the
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operation of mind and human values are important, and must
be considered whether or not values always determine behavior.
In other words, what human beings think and believe are impor-
tant to the theoretical project.
A final area of convergence is the indispensable role of
"abstractive" thinking. Willer and Willer (1975:12) explain this
by making reference to "plato's postulat~on of a world of fo.rms
in which the diversified objects of experience are reflected m a
pure idea, or form, which those objects resemble but never
achieve." Willer and Willer (1973:13) provide a modern analogue
of this for sociology in Max Weber's ideal types.
A similar recognition of this profound contribution to socio-
logy comes from phenomenology . Joseph ~ockelmans provi~es
support for the construction of ideal types in language congemal
to the exact theorist.
[I] deal types are means to the end of understanding phenom-
ena.... Weber contrasts his own position with the view accord-
ing to which it is the end and goal of every science to order its
data into a system of concepts, the content of which is to be
acquired and slowly perfected through the observation of empiri-
cal regularities, the construction of hypotheses, and their veri-
fication, until fmally a 'complete' and hence deductive science
emerges. According to this view the concepts are the ends and
not the means of understanding the phenomena. For those who
fully perceive the implications of the .. fundamental i~eas of.,
modern epistemology which ultimately derives from Kant,
. namely , that scientific' concepts are primarily 'analytical instru-
ments for the intellectual mastery of empirical data and can
only be that, the fact that precise concepts are necessarily ideal
types will not cause them to desist from constructing them
(Kockelmans, 1978:12-13).
This is the quintessence of exact theory and reflects a basis
for a claim to a phenomenological foundation. As Kockelmans
states:
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standing ... between the purely formal concepts of the a priori
framework of meaning and the concrete historical phenomena to
be explained empirically ..., ideal types are capable of mediating
between social theory and our explanation of the social 'facts'
which occur in a given society (Kockelmans, 1978:14).
I have emphasized the similarities between a philosophically
consistent grounded theory and exact theory, and believe these
points of convergence are important. The epistemological founda-
tions of their view of theory construction exhibits a more self-
conscious awareness of the limitations of knowledge than is true
of the adherents of the propositional approach. Whether this
results in better social theory remains to be seen, since practi-
tioners have the tendency to reduce an epistemology to a techni-
que, as is especially true of propositional theorists. As I have
mentioned, Willer does not deal with the role of the researcher in
any detail; further, without an explicit account of the relation-
ship of knowledge and experience, exact theory has the danger
of lapsing into an untenable position maintaining that knowledge
without experience is possible. I have suggested that a phenomeno-
logical explanation could resolve this problem, but exact 'theory
should address this issue and make the relationship explicit.
In comparison, propositional theory combines the worst
aspects of an unjustified epistemological self-confidence with a
narrow focus on technique. Of the three types of theory construc-
tion that I have presented, certainly the propositional approac.h
is the most accepted and has the most adherents. The identifica-
tion of this approach with proper sociological method couldbe
offered as evidence that sociology is a normative discipline, and
indeed the propositional method is transmitted to sociological
neophytes with more normative content than critical examina-
tion of the epistemological foundation upon which the method
is based. One need only compare the enormous efforts that have
been devoted to the refinement of techniques with the meager
theoretical results in order to question teaching this method as
if its transformation to full maturity had already occurred.
The fatal weakness of the propositional approach, its im-
plicit belief that observation is a neutral picturing of reality,
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There can be no doubt that all our knowledge begins with ex-
perience.... [W]e have no knowledge antecedent to experience,
and with experience all our knowledge begins. But though all
our knowledge begins with experience, it does not follow that
it all arises out of experience.
Empiricists, including propositional theorists, resolve this dilemma
by dogmatically adhering to the first part while ignoring t~e ad-
monition that knowledge is not simply a product of expenence.
The strength of a phenomenological approach is that it attempts
to explain the relationship of knowledge and experience in terms
of the active role of the observer in interpreting experience through
a theoretic structure.
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Numerous studies of American New Left actrvists have
greatly increased our understanding of political protest pheno-
mena.. Particularly our comprehension of the sociological and
psychological characteristics of protesters has been significantly
enhanced (Keniston, 1968; Hampden-Turner, 1971). However, as
some researchers have noted (Szliowicz, 1972:6-9), protesters'
characteristics have been emphasized to the virtual exclusion of
political variables.
While protest theorists (Useem, 1972) have frequently
observed that a good deal of ideological change takes place during
activists' protest careers, detailed studies of changes in the political
attitudes of New Leftists over time have been notably absent.
Whereas the processes by which political systems socialize the
young into acceptance of prevailing political institutions have
been extensively studied (Dawson and Prewitt, 1969; Langton,
1969), little attention has been devoted to the processes of de-
socialization.
For several reasons 'we should expect that regime' soci~- ...
ization of the young is not always permanent. In their study. of
5600 ' citizens in six developing countries, Inkeles and Smith
(1974) found that individuals are not as resistant to political
change after childhood as expected. Modern political attitudes
are heavily influenced by experiences in later adolescence and
early adulthood. Moreover, the Third World citizen's later ac-
ceptance of modern political attitudes tends to be enduring and
irreversible.
Involvement in New Left protest activities by young citizens
can be expected to result in significant ideological movement
away from acceptance of the regime's political institutions. First,
as Erikson (1970:164) noted, ideological experimentation is a
